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The Error-Related Negativity (Ne or ERN) is a reliable electrophysiological index of error
processing, which has been found to be independent of whether a subject is aware of
an error or not. A large Ne was equally seen after errors that were consciously detected
(Aware errors) and those that were not (Unaware errors), compared to a small negativity
for correct responses (CRN). This suggests a dissociation between an automatic,
preconscious error processing mechanism and subjective evaluation. A common concern
regarding this ﬁnding is that subjects could have been somewhat aware of their errors, but
did not report them due to lack of conﬁdence. Here we tested this possibility directly using
a betting paradigm which allowed us to separate occasions in which the subjects were
conﬁdent of their response and trials in which they were unsure. In a choice reaction time
task, subjects directly judged the accuracy of each response (correct or error) and then bet
on this judgment using a high, medium, or low amount of money. The bets were used to
determine the level of conﬁdence the subjects had of their response. The average across
all subjects regardless of conﬁdence (betting) measure replicated the reported ﬁnding of
an equal Ne for Aware and Unaware errors which was larger than the CRN. However, when
Ne measurement was conﬁned to high conﬁdence (high bet) trials in conﬁdent subjects, a
prominent Ne was seen only for Aware errors, while conﬁdent Unaware errors (i.e., error
trials on which subjects made high bets that they were correct) elicited a response that did
not differ from the CRN elicited by truly correct answers. In contrast, for low conﬁdence
trials in unconﬁdent subjects, an intermediate and equal Ne/CRN was elicited by Correct
responses, Aware and Unaware errors. These results provide direct evidence that the
Ne is related to error awareness, and suggest the amplitude of the Ne/CRN depends on
individual differences in error reporting and conﬁdence.
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INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, we are sometimes acutely aware of having made
an error (the notorious “oops” sensation), but at other times we
are oblivious of our errors (e.g., when we make typographical
errors). In many cases, effective performance of a task requires
that errors will be promptly detected and swiftly corrected (e.g.,
driving or machine operation). Understanding the conditions
that lead to error awareness is important for understanding the
executive functions that guide goal-directed activity and learn-
ing. One of the most intriguing questions in the area of error
awareness is why some errors reach awareness while others stay
unnoticed. Yet before this question can be answered, it is cru-
cialtodeterminewhetherunnoticederrorsareprocessedaserrors
at all. Using electrophysiology, it has repeatedly been shown that
errors in various tasks and modalities are processed as errors by
the brain even if we are unaware of making them (Nieuwenhuis
etal.,2001;Endrassetal.,2005,2007;O’Connell etal.,2007,2009;
Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi et al., 2009; Dhar et al., 2011; Hughes
and Yeung, 2011). In each of these studies, awareness of errors
was reported on a single trial basis, and a large Error-Related
Negativity (Ne; Falkenstein et al., 1991;o rE R N ;Gehring et al.,
1993), a fronto-central ERP component locked to the incorrect
response, was equally seen after errors that were reported (Aware
errors) and those that weren’t (Unaware errors). In most cases, a
much smaller response-locked negativity was elicited by correct
responses (Correct-Related Negativity, CRN; Ford, 1999; Vidal
et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2001). In contrast to the insensitivity
of the Ne to awareness, a later centro-parietal Error Positivity
wave (Pe; Falkenstein et al., 1991) was elicited only after Aware
errors. Two additional event-related fMRI studies by Hester et al.
(2005)a n dKlein et al. (2007) further supported these ﬁndings
by showing that the Anterior-Cingulate region associated with
the generation of the Ne (Dehaene et al., 1994; Brazdil et al.,
2002; Debener et al., 2005) does not show a difference between
Aware and Unaware errors (see also Stemmer et al., 2004), while
Aware errors only were associated with larger bilateral activation
of prefrontalandparietalregions (Hester et al., 2005) or left ante-
rior Insula activity (Klein et al., 2007). These ﬁndings led to the
widespread notion that error monitoring, as reﬂected by the Ne,
goes on regardless of conscious awareness of making errors (e.g.,
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Simons, 2009). However, ﬁndings from a handful of studies that
showedthattheNewassmallerforostensiblyunawareerrorsraise
doubts regarding whether the Ne is truly insensitive to awareness.
Maieret al.(2008,Experiment2), usingamaskedFlankertask,
and Steinhauser and Yeung (2010), using a brightness discrimi-
nation task, both asked subjects to judge their own accuracy on
a single-trial basis, and found a larger Ne for Aware than for
Unaware errors. Woodman (2010) used a visual-search task in
which in some trials the targets were rendered invisible by sub-
stitution masking. Although the participants were notrequired to
indicate awareness of their errors, errors in masked-target trials
were assumed to be Unaware errors because the participants were
at chance in detecting the presence of the target. An Ne was gen-
erated only by errors committed during the non-masked trials,
even though masked targets also attracted attention, as evidenced
by the N2pc component. Praamstra et al. (2003) induced errors
in a cued tapping task by small or large shifts (15 or 50ms) in
the cue timing. While they also did not require their subjects to
report awareness of an error, they assumed that the small shifts
are below perception threshold whereas the large shifts are con-
sciously detected. Since only large shifts were followed by an Ne,
the results were once again taken to suggest that awareness of the
errors is a prerequisite for Ne elicitation.
A major critique for the experiments that showed that the Ne
was independent of conscious awareness pertains to the deter-
mination of the level of error awareness. Were subjects really
unaware of the error or was their criterion for reporting an error
too high? This criterion may be inﬂuenced by individual tenden-
cies, as well as by task instructions and demand characteristics
artifacts. If subjects are in fact under-reporting their awareness,
the Unaware Error bin could be contaminated by (unreported)
Aware errors which have a larger Ne, leading to an inﬂated Ne for
Unaware errors.
This possibility was in fact directly addressed by Scheffers and
Coles (2000)whousedcertaintyratingsinsteadoferror-reporting
on a trial-by-trial basis. Their subjects performed a Flanker task
and immediately afterwards had to indicate their conﬁdence on
a ﬁve-point scale from “sure correct,” through “don’t know,” to
“ s u r ei n c o r r e c t . ”T h es i z eo ft h eN ed e p e n d e do nt h es u b j e c t i v e
conﬁdence of making an error. These results have recently been
replicated by Hewig et al. (2011) and suggest that the Ne is an
index of subjective, rather than objective error monitoring. This
conjecture is supported by studies which used indirect measure
of error certainty, such as post-test questionnaires and reaction
times (RTs), under the assumption that slower responses indi-
cate uncertainty (Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004a; Wessel et al.,
2011). All the above studies that measured the Pe component
(Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010; Woodman, 2010; Hewig et al.,
2011;Wessel etal.,2011),foundt hatitwaslargerforA war eerr ors
than Unaware errors. Taken together, these studies support the
premise that the Ne, like the Pe, is an index of subjective error
processing. They contradict a large body of evidence (including
our own, Shalgi et al., 2009 and Shalgi and Deouell, 2010)t h a t
showed no effect of awareness on the Ne.
Here, we directly addressed this contradiction by using a
paradigm in which we previously found a similar Ne for Aware
and Unaware errors (Shalgi and Deouell, 2010), together with a
wagering paradigm (see Ullsperger et al., 2010) which was shown
tobeamoreobjective measureofawarenessthendirectintrospec-
tion (Persaud et al., 2007). Instead of directly asking participants
to assess their own certainty, the subjects are required to make
a bet of a small, medium, or large amount of money on their
accuracy judgment (rather than on the actual response). If the
participants’decisionabouttheiraccuracyiscorrect,theywinthis
money; otherwise, they lose it. The optimal strategy is to bet high
whenever they feel they are not just guessing. In other words, par-
ticipants are willing “to put their money where their mouth is”
(Koch and Preuschoff, 2007). In the current study, we employed
this betting paradigm to separate trials in which the participants
were sure of their response from trials in which they were unsure
without explicitly asking for conﬁdence ratings. We expected that
if the Ne is indeed independent of awareness, it should be elicited
even when the subjects are highly conﬁdent that they are right.
Conversely, if Ne is only elicited by Aware errors, it should be
eliminated if subjects are conﬁdent that they had not made an
error.
To summarize, previous studies suggested that the Ne is inde-
pendent from error awareness, while other ﬁndings showed that
the Ne is affected by subjective conﬁdence. We aimed to repli-
cate both ﬁndings in the sameexperiment, with better conﬁdence
assessment, in order to explain the discrepancy between the
former studies.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
The participants were 22 students (14 males, all right handed as a
prerequisite due to the lateralized aspect of the task), aged 23–32
(mean = 25.73, SD = 2.7), with reportedly normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and no history of neurological disorders. Two
additional subjects were tested but were excluded from analysis;
one due to a very small number of Unaware errors (see “Analysis
of Behavior”) and the other due to a misunderstanding of task
instructions. All students were paid a minimum ﬂat fee or given
coursecreditsfortheirparticipationinthestudy.Inaddition,they
c o u l dm a k eu pt oa ne x t r a2 5N I S( ∼7$, the equivalent of lunch
at the campus cafeteria) by wagering correctly on their responses
in the experiment (see “Procedure”), but they could never lose
money (i.e., get less than the minimum fee). Written consent was
obtained after the experimental procedures were explained. The
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of
Social Science at the Hebrew University.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
Participants satinadimlylit,soundattenuated andecho-reduced
chamber (Eckel C-26, UK). Stimuli included seven white shapes
(diamond, triangle, pentagon, parallelogram, trapezoid, circle,
pie) of four different sizes (subtending visual angles of 1.2◦–1.8◦)
on a gray background, presented on a Viewsonic G75f CRT
monitor, 100cm from the subjects’ eyes. A row of three shapes
appeared on every trial (see Figure1). The lateral shapes and the
central shape were never the same size. Shapes were spaced 5.08◦
apart. A cushioned tray was placed on the subjects’ lap. On the
right of the tray was a two-button response box with the buttons
“YES” and “NO,” their side counterbalanced across participants.
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FIGURE 1 | The trial procedure and some example trials.
On the left was a computer mouse used to make the secondary
responses (see “Procedure”).
PROCEDURE
We developed the Lateralized Error Awareness Task (LEAT) to
enable the separation of left and right errors and to obtain an
awareness index of each error (Shalgi and Deouell, 2010). The
LEAT is a manual choice-reaction time task in which participants
are presented with three horizontally aligned shapes in each trial.
In the primary task, the participants are instructed to press the
“ Y E S ”b u t t o ni fo n eo ft h es h a p e si sad e s i g n a t e dt a r g e ts h a p e
(Shape target), or if one of the lateral shapes (left or right) is the
same shape as the central shape (Matching target), disregarding
shape sizes, and to press the “NO” button otherwise.
A small black ﬁxation cross appeared constantly at the center
of the screen. Each trial started with the three shapes presented
for 120ms. Four hundred milliseconds after their disappearance,
the color of the central ﬁxation changed from black to light gray.
The participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible
only once the ﬁxation had changed its color, creating a response
delay in order to increase the number of Unaware errors (see
Shalgi et al., 2007). There was no time limit on the response,
so participants were forced to make a choice in each trial, but if
their RT was longer than 1320ms, a screen was displayed which
reminded the participants to respond when the color of the ﬁx-
ation changes. Shape presentation time was too short to allow
lateral eye movements; participants were required to ﬁxate on
the central cross and were advised that this will allow for best
performance.
Five to seven hundred milliseconds after the primaryresponse,
an “Accuracy Judgment” screen appeared in which the choice
the participant had just made (“YES” or “NO”) was displayed,
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together with two on-screen buttons labeled “Correct” and
“Error,” and the participant had to click one of the buttons
using the mouse controlled with their left hand. The left hand
was used for mouse responses as the right (dominant) hand
was always kept on the response box for the primary speeded
response. Immediately after the participants made their judg-
ment, a “Betting” screen appeared which informed the partici-
pant of the judgment they had just made (“Correct” or “Error”)
and asked them to bet on this decision by clicking the mouse on
oneofthree credits: 1(smallbet), 2(mediumbet), or3(high bet).
The participants were not told how much money each credit was
worth,onlythatalargernumberofcreditsmeantmoremoney(as
an added incentive, an image of a small, medium, or large money
bag was displayed beside each credit amount, see Figure1). The
participants were told that if they had made a correct accuracy
judgment they would win the number of credits they had bet
on, but in case of an incorrect accuracy judgment they would
lose that same amount. Both the Accuracy Judgment and the
Betting screens were displayed until the participants made their
choice. The black ﬁxation cross stayed on constantly during these
screens. After placing a bet, the ﬁxation screen was displayed for
800–1000ms, followed by the next trial.
Each block consisted of 88 trials, of which 44 were target trials
(50%),equallydividedbetween ShapeandMatchingtargets. Each
target shape or matching shape appeared equallyon the left or on
the right (the target shape never appeared as the central shape).
The order of the stimuli was randomized across participants. To
complicate the task and elicit more errors, every 22 trials (i.e.,
four times per block), a different shape (one of the seven possi-
ble shapes at random) was designated as the Shape target, using
a screen that announced the change and displayed the new tar-
get shape at the center of the screen for two seconds. Each block
lasted approximately six minutes. The results of each block were
not displayed to the participants so they could not use them to
change or adjust their strategy.
Two practice blocks of 15 trials each preceded the experiment,
both with neither the Accuracy judgment screen nor the Betting
screen. In the ﬁrst practice, the participants were introduced only
to the Matching targets in order to acquaint them with the differ-
ent shapes and sizes and to gradually ease them into the task. In
the second practice, the Shape target condition was introduced.
When the participants were conﬁdent in their understanding of
the task,they performed 16consecutive experimental blocks.Due
to the length of the experiment, after eight blocks the participants
were taken out of the recording chamber for a 5–10minute rest,
without removing the electrode cap.
Following the testing session, participants ﬁlled a question-
naire in which they rated task difﬁculty and estimated their own
accuracy.The amountof credits won atthe end ofthe experiment
was converted to cash using a pre-formed conversion table.
ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR
Errors judged as “Error” in the Accuracy Judgment screen were
considered Aware errors, and Errors judged as “Correct” were
considered Unaware errors. Correct responses judged as “Error”
were classiﬁed as False Errors. The percentage of False Errors for
each participant was very low, ranging between 0.1–6% (mean
2.1%, SD 1.6%), and therefore, this type of error was not further
analyzed.TrialswithprimaryRTs fasterthan50msorslowerthan
2500ms were excluded from analysis. Accuracy was calculated
s e p a r a t e l yf o re a c hb e tc a t e g o r y( 1 ,2 ,o r3 ) .E r r o rA w a r e n e s sr a t e
w a sc a l c u l a t e da st h en u m b e ro fA w a r ee r r o r sd i v i d e db yt h et o t a l
number of errors. RTs were calculated across blocks separately for
the different response types and for the different bet categories
(there werenotenougherrortrialstodivideresponsetypebybet).
The different measures were compared separately using repeated
measures ANOVAs. Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied
when necessary and the uncorrected degrees of freedom are pre-
sented along with the Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon where it was
<1( Picton et al., 2000). Contrasts were performed using paired
sample t-tests.
EEG RECORDING
EEG was recorded continuously with Ag/AgCl electrodes from 64
scalp electrodes, left and right mastoid sites, and the tip of the
nose, using a BioSemi Active 2 system (Biosemi, Netherlands).
Blinks and eye movements were monitored using four additional
EOG electrodes located at the outer canthus of the right and
left eyes and above and below the center of the right eye. The
EEG was continuously sampled at 512Hz and stored for off-line
analysis. Analsyis was conducted using BrainVision Analyzer 2
(BrainProducts,Germany),andMatlabR2011a(TheMathWorks
Inc., Natick, MA). For two participants, data from one malfunc-
tioning electrode (P3 or CP3) was replaced by using spherical
spline interpolation (Perrin et al., 1989; Perrin, 1990,i m p l e -
mented by Analyzer 2). The EEG data was digitally referenced to
the nose and ﬁltered with a bandpass of 0.5–20Hz (zero-phase
24dB/octave Butterworth ﬁlter). Blink artifacts were removed
using the Independent Component Analysis (ICA) method (Jung
et al.,2000; asimplemented in Analyzer 2).Note that althoughwe
corrected for blink artifacts, we ﬁrst veriﬁed that the participants
did not blink during stimulus presentation. This was the case
for all subjects and trials, with negligible exceptions. Segments
contaminated by other artifacts were discarded (rejection crite-
ria: >100μV absolute difference between samples within seg-
ments of100ms;absoluteamplitudebeyondthe ±100μVrange).
Artifact-free EEG data was parsed into 900ms response-locked
segments starting 400ms before the response. An average of
93.6% segments survived artifact rejection (range per partic-
ipant, per response type 75.7–100%). The inclusion criterion
was at least 20 Unaware Error segments which survived artifact
rejection.
Response-locked segments were averaged separately for
Correct responses, Aware errors, and Unaware errors, and within
each category for bets 1 and 3. The 2 (medium) bet was excluded
from analysis as it was only used to get a cleaner measure of the
participants’ conﬁdence in the 1 and 3 bet bins. By including this
b e to p t i o n ,w ec o u l db em o r ec o n ﬁ d e n tt h a tw h e np a r t i c i p a n t s
chose to bet on 1 they were unsure of their decision and when
they chose to bet on 3 they were conﬁdent, as all the intermediate
cases would fall into the 2 bin. Potentials were measured relative
to a 400–200ms pre-response baseline period (O’Connell et al.,
2007; Shalgi et al., 2009). This baseline period did not include the
immediate pre-response period as the neural activity leading to
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the response naturally starts earlier than the ﬁnal motor outcome
of the button press.
ERP ANALYSIS
The Error Negativity: The Ne amplitude and latency were
detected individually for each participant and each subcategory
andmeasured in theresponse-locked averagesasthemean ampli-
tude ±4ms around the most negative peak at the interval of
0–150ms post-response at electrode FCz.
The Error Positivity: As the Pe is a more sustained parietal
wave, it was pre-deﬁned based on our previous studies as the
average amplitude at electrode Pz between 300 and 500ms post
response in the response locked averages. Since inspection of the
grand average waveforms (see Figure3) suggested that the Pe
began at around 200ms, we also performed all analyses of the
Pe on the 200–500ms timeframe, and obtained the same quali-
tative results. Therefore, only the results of the ﬁrst analysis will
be reported.
To simulate traditional procedures, the Ne and Pe ampli-
tudes were entered separately into One-Way repeated measures
A N O V A sf o rR e s p o n s eT y p e( C o r r e c t ,A w a r eE r r o r ,U n a w a r e
Error), across all subjects and bets. Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rection was applied where necessary. Contrasts were performed
using paired sample t-tests.
The cardinal question of this study was whether the Ne is
affected by awareness when subjects are highly conﬁdent of being
aware or unaware of making an error. To that end, we isolated
the group of 12 participants who had enough (deﬁned a-priori
as more than 20 EEG segments available for analysis) Aware and
Unaware error trials with bet 3, and repeated the above One-
Way ANOVA analysis with bet 3 trials only. A similar analysis
for bet 1 responses was conducted for those eight subjects who
had enough Aware and Unaware errors with bet 1. Three sub-
jects were included in both groups, four participants did not have
enough segments to beincludedinanygroupandoneparticipant
was excluded from this analysis dueto noisy data (see “Analysis of
the Response-Locked Waveforms After Subtracting the Stimulus-
locked Waveform” in Appendix for the number of trials in each
group).
Hardly any subjects bet enough on both 1 and 3 for both
Aware and Unaware errors to allow a full within subject analysis.
Therefore, in order to compare the awareness effect between con-
ﬁdent and less conﬁdent subjects, we omitted the three subjects
who were included in both groups above from the high conﬁ-
dence group, which now included only those nine subjects who
had enough bet 3 errors of both types b u tl e s st h a n2 0b e t1e r r o r s .
TheNeandPeoftheHighConﬁdence(HiC)andLowConﬁdence
(LoC) groups were then compared across all bets using a mixed
ANOVA with Group as the between-subject factor and Response
Type asthe within-subject factor.Contrasts wereperformedusing
independent-samples t-tests.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Accuracy and error awareness
The behavioral results are summarized in Figure2. Although the
subjects rated the task asrelatively difﬁcult(mean 3.6/5, SD0.85),
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results of all 22 participants.
accuracy in the task was quite high (85.9%, SD 4.6%). Overall
awareness of errors was 50.1% (SD 14.7%).
Overall, bet 3 was the popular bet (67.9%), followed by bet
2 (19.6%), and ﬁnally bet 1 (12.3%). Rational calculations pre-
dict that due to the high accuracy in the task, a strategy of always
betting on 3 would yield the highest result, and participants
might have intuitively made this assumption. Figure2Bdescribes
the betting patterns for the different response types. When the
participants were correct, they were usually certain about their
answer (bet 3). Uncertainty went up with the different types of
errors: when participants made an Aware Error they tended to
bet less on 3 than when they were correct, and even less so when
they made an Unaware error. They were least certain when they
(rarely) mistakenly judgeda correct response asanerror.Primary
response accuracies for the three bet categories were 52.8% (SD
12.4) for bet 1, 75.1% (SD 12.2) for bet 2 and 91.1% (SD 4) for
bet 3 [F(2, 38) = 152.9, p < 0.001, ε = 0.95]; two subjects were
excluded from this analysis as they did not have any bet 2 or
any bet 1 choices. Accuracy for bet 1 was lower than for bet 2
[t(19) = 10.55, p < 0.001], which was in turn lower than the
accuracy for bet 3 [t(19) = 7.89, p < 0.001].
Reaction times
Reaction times in this task were relatively long (across bets:
Correct responses 814.7ms, SD 42.8; Aware errors 885.8ms, SD
64; Unaware errors 889ms, SD 64.9) due to the task instruc-
tions to delay responses until the ﬁxation changed its color.
Nevertheless, the RTs depended on accuracy [F(2, 42) = 54.67,
p < 0.001,ε = 0.98]astheRTs forCorrect responses wereshorter
than those for errors [t(21) = 11.34, p < 0.001]; there was no
difference between RTs for Aware and Unaware errors p = 0.71.
There was also a signiﬁcant difference between RTs of responses
followed by the different bet categories [F(2, 38) = 66.61, p <
0.001, ε = 0.99]: RTs followed by bet 1 (952.2ms, SD = 84.9)
were signiﬁcantly longer than RTs followed by bet 2 [885ms,
SD = 98.1; t(19) = 5.47, p < 0.001] and these in turn were sig-
niﬁcantly longer than RTs followed by bet 3 [796.9ms SD = 41.4;
t(20) = 6.33, p < 0.001]. This supports the assumption that par-
ticipants bet on 1 when they were less conﬁdent of their response
(slowerRTs duetohesitation) andon3 whentheywere conﬁdent.
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FIGURE 3 | Grand average (N = 22) response-locked ERPs to correct and error responses across all bets at electrode (A) FCz and (B) Pz. The bottom
panel shows the scalp topography at the time of (A) the CRN/Ne peak and (B) the Pe.
Debrieﬁng
Upon debrieﬁng in the post-test questionnaire, all participants
noted they made their bets according to their level of certainty.
Taken together with the behavioral results, we can be quite sure
that each bet category corresponds to a certainty rating.
ERP RESULTS
Awareness effects regardless of conﬁdence
Replicating the results of traditional studies not assessing con-
ﬁdence, a clear Ne was elicited across subjects and bets by
both Aware and Unaware errors, beginning before the response
and peaking after the response (Figure3A). A CRN can be
seen at about the same time for Correct responses. A sig-
niﬁcant effect in a One-Way repeated measures ANOVA for
Response Type was found for the Ne amplitude [F(2, 42) = 10.2,
p < 0.001, ε = 0.959]. This stemmed from a difference between
errors and Correct responses [t(21) = 4.57, p < 0.001] while
there was no difference between the Ne amplitude for Aware
and Unaware errors [t(21) = 1.79, p = 0.09]. Note that while
the peak-to-trough CRN seems to be around the same size or
even larger than the Ne, supplementary analysis (see “Analysis of
the Response-locked Waveforms After Subtracting the Stimulus-
locked Waveform” in Appendix) which corrected for the over-
lapping effect of the stimulus-locked P3, revealed that the CRN
is indeed smaller than the Ne. Figure3B illustrates the results
at electrode Pz, where the Pe can be seen as the slow positivity
following the response for Aware errors only. A signiﬁcant effect
in a One-Way repeated measures ANOVA for Response Type
was found for the Pe amplitude [F(2, 42) = 35.32, p < 0.001, ε =
0.82], which stemmed from the difference between Aware errors
and Correct responses [t(21) = 6.67, p < 0.001] and the differ-
ence between Aware errors and Unaware errors [t(21) = 6.47,
p < 0.001].
Awareness effects with conﬁdent accuracy judgments
The most critical question in our study is whether awareness
affects the Ne when subjects are highly conﬁdent of having made
an error or highly conﬁdent that they have not made one, as
indicated by their willingness to put a high bet on this decision.
Note that when participants make an error and bet the high-
est bet on having made one, they are conﬁdent that an error
has been made, that is, they demonstrate high error awareness.
Similarly, when subjects place the highest bet on having made
a correct response, when in fact they have committed an error,
they demonstrate clear unawareness of the error. Thus, we iso-
lated 12subjects who had enough bet 3 trials for both Aware and
Unaware errors (see “Methods”), and measured the Ne and Pe
for their bet 3 trials only. Contrary to the previous results, the Ne
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FIGURE 4 | Effect of conﬁdence on response-locked ERPs at electrodes FCz and Pz, when only high (A) or low (B) bets are averaged.
waslargerfor AwareerrorsthanforUnawareerrors,andUnaware
errors did not differ from Correct responses (Figure4A), main
effect: [F(2, 22) = 8.65, p < 0.005, ε = 0.77], Aware errors vs.
Unaware errors: [t(11) = 3.26, p < 0.01], Corrects vs. Unaware
errors: [t(11) = 0.42, p = 0.68]. Thus, when only clear cases of
subjective error awareness or unawareness are taken into consid-
eration,the Neis foundto bestrongly affected byerrorawareness.
ThePetoo waslargeonlyforAwareerrorsinthebet 3trialsinthis
group [F(2, 22) = 20.35, p < 0.001, ε = 0.67], Correct Responses
vs. Aware errors: [t(11) = 4.67, p < 0.005], Aware vs. Unaware:
[t(11) = 5.36,p < 0.001].Thus,boththeNeandthePearelarger
for Aware errors when subjects are conﬁdent of their awareness.
Awareness effects with low-conﬁdence accuracy judgments
To examine the awareness effect when subjects are not sure about
their performance, we isolated eight subjects who had enough
bet 1 trials for both Aware and Unaware errors (see “Methods”),
and measured the Ne and Pe for their bet 1 trials only. When
subjects were only willing to place the lowest possible bet on
their decision, we surmise that they were not sure of whether
they had made an error or not. In other words, they may have
had only a trace of awareness of an error when they had made
one, and conversely may have had some trace of awareness of
an error even if one had not been committed. Indeed, the Ne
and Pe were similar for all responses—Correct, Aware errors, and
Unaware errors (Figure4B), [Ne:F(2, 14) < 1,p = 0.47,ε = 0.67;
Pe: F(2, 14) = 2.77, p = 0.13, ε = 0.6]. This ﬁnding supports the
notion that the Ne is affected by the level of subjective error
awareness.
Since there were many Correct responses with both bets in
this group of subjects, we could directly compare between bet 1
and bet 3. “Analysis of the Correct Response-locked Waveforms
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of the Low Conﬁdence Group After Subtracting the Stimulus-
locked Waveform”in Appendix shows the CRN and Pe of Correct
responses for the two bets after correcting for the overlapping
effect of the stimulus locked P3. The difference between the
CRN for bet 1 and bet 3 was signiﬁcant [t(7) = 2.38, p < 0.05].
However, the Pe for Correct responses did not signiﬁcantly differ
between bet 1 and 3 [t(7) = 1, p = 0.35].
Direct comparison between low and high conﬁdence groups
As noted in the methods section, the number of errors in each
response-typeandbetprecludedacompletewithin-subjectanaly-
sisofhigh andlowbets. However,wecouldcomparehighandlow
conﬁdence subjects, collapsing across their bets (see “Methods”).
For this analysis, high conﬁdence subjects were those nine sub-
jects who had made enough bet 3 aware and unaware errors but
few(<20)bet1errors(HiCgroup),whilelowconﬁdencesubjects
were the eight subjects who had enough bet 1 aware and unaware
errors (LoC group). As the groups did not overlap, they could be
compared directly (Table 1, Figures5and6). The groups differed
signiﬁcantly in primary task accuracy [t(15) = 2.88, p < 0.05]
but not in error awareness rates [t(15) = 1.16, p = 0.26] or sub-
jective rating of task difﬁculty [t(15) = 1.2, p = 0.25]. As may
be expected by the group division criteria, the betting patterns
of the groups (Figure5) were signiﬁcantly different; a signiﬁcant
main effect of the within-subject factor Bet was moderated by
an interaction with the between-subject factor Group in a mixed
ANOVA [main effect: F(2, 30) = 28.7, p < 0.001, ε = 0.71; inter-
action: F(2, 30) = 6.98, p < 0.01]. The interaction stemmed from
different usage of the 1 and 3 bets between groups.
Figure6 shows a dramatic effect of conﬁdence in the
Ne period. While the Ne for Unaware errors aligns with the
Ne for Aware errors in the LoC group, there is practically no
Ne for Unaware errors in the HiC group. That is, the response
for Unaware errors is similar to the CRN elicited by Correct
responses. A mixed ANOVA with the within factor Response
Type and between factor Group for the Ne amplitude con-
ﬁrmed these results, showing a signiﬁcant effect of Response
Type [F(2, 30) = 8.8, p < 0.005, ε = 0.95] which was moderated
by a signiﬁcant interaction [F(2, 30) = 3.55, p < 0.05]. To eluci-
date this interaction, we compared the Ne amplitude between
groupsseparatelyforeachresponsetype. There wasno signiﬁcant
difference between the Ne for Correct responses [t(15) = 0.77,
Table 1 | Comparison of the behavioral results of the High and Low
Conﬁdence Groups.
High Conﬁdence Low Conﬁdence P-value
(N = 9)( N = 8)
Accuracy 87.9% (4%) 82.5% (3.65%) 0.011∗
Awareness 51.9% (11%) 45% (12.9%) 0.264
Difﬁculty rating 3.33 (1.12) 3.87 (0.64) 0.248
RT 833.4 (19.95) 823.5 (52.83) 0.074
%Bet 1 5.92% (4.5%) 22.39% (18.2%) 0.019∗
%Bet 2 12.61 (9.6%) 27.96% (20.95%) 0.066
%Bet 3 81.21 (13.9%) 49.41% (29.2%) 0.01∗
∗p < 0.05.
FIGURE 5 | Proportion of each bet category for each response type for
the High and Low Conﬁdence groups.
p = 0.45] or for Aware errors [t(15) = 0.12, p = 0.9], but there
was a signiﬁcantly larger Ne for Unaware errors in the LoC group
compared to the HiC group [t(15) = 2.26, p < 0.05].
The same mixed ANOVA for the amplitude of the Pe showed
a signiﬁcant effect of Response Type [F(2, 30) = 23.91, p < 0.001,
ε = 0.81] but no interaction [F(2, 30) < 1, p = 0.98]. Follow-up
contrasts on the main effect of Response Type revealed a differ-
ence between the Pe for Aware and Unaware errors [t(15) = 5.21,
p < 0.001] and no difference between the Pe for Correct and
Unaware errors [t(15) = 1.75, p = 0.1].
DISCUSSION
Optimizing goal-directed behavior in imperfect conditions likely
relies on both implicit and explicit error detection processes. In
order to understand the unique contribution of each type of pro-
cess, an essential initial step is to ﬁnd physiological indices of
aware and unaware error processing. Previous research linked
the Ne component, occurring within the ﬁrst 100ms after the
response, to processing of errors independent of conscious-
ness, while awareness of errors inﬂuenced the amplitude of the
Pe component at latencies longer than 250ms post-response
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005, 2007; O’Connell
et al., 2007, 2009; Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi et al., 2009; Dhar
et al., 2011; Hughes and Yeung, 2011). This was based on the
ﬁnding that an Ne was similarly elicited whether subjects were
aware of making an error or not, while a large Pe wasrestricted to
errors of which the subjects were aware. Here, we replicated this
result across subjects in a new visual choice-reaction time task.
A signiﬁcant Ne was elicited both by errors the subjects reported
(Aware errors)and byerrors the subjects did not report (Unaware
errors). However, awareness is not necessarily a binary situation,
and subjects may differ in their criterion for reporting awareness.
That is, some subjects may not report awareness of an error even
if they have some notion of making one, but are not absolutely
sure. In this situation, some putative unaware errors would be
contaminated with “partial awareness,” and the elicitation of Ne
for these errors would not be evidence for processing of errors
without awareness.
In an attempt to get a stricter selection of unaware errors
and clarify this question, we used a wagering paradigm, asking
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FIGURE 6 | Effect of conﬁdence on response-locked ERPs at electrodes FCz and Pz. (A) High conﬁdence group (B) Low conﬁdence group. (C) The
interaction between Group and Response Type.
subjects to indicate not only whether they had made an error or
not, but also to bet money on their answer to this question. The
pivotal working assumption was that if subjects report that they
have not made an error (when one was made) yet they have some
awareness that an error might have been committed, they would
be reluctant to bet a large sum of money on their report. Indeed,
subjects’ debrieﬁng, as well as RTs, suggest that they placed their
bets based on their conﬁdence. Based on this working hypoth-
esis, the critical question was whether an Ne would be elicited
when subjects were conﬁdent that they had not made an error,
so much that they were willing to risk losing money. That is, in a
condition mitigating the risk of partial awareness. The answer to
this question was clear: when participants were highly conﬁdent
that they had made an error (as indicated by a high bet), a large
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Ne was elicited, but when they were highly conﬁdent that they
did not make an Error, the Ne was comparable to the CRN. That
is, there was no indication of error processing without awareness
in this case. On the other hand, subjects who were more hesi-
tant about their accuracy-judgment responses had an equal Ne
for Aware and Unaware errors.
Thus, under stricter selection of Unaware errors, our results
support the premise that the Ne is related to subjective awareness
of an error. Unlike previous studies that showed this effect (e.g.,
Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Hewig et al., 2011), our ﬁndings can-
not be explained by the difﬁculty of performing the task, i.e., of
making mistakes rather than slips (Reason, 1990). Mistakes are
errors in which the participant cannotsolve the task, for example,
when representation ofthe stimulusis degraded,or when the task
is too cognitively demanding, and therefore, a correct response
representation cannot be accurately formed. Slips are errors in
which the correct response representation can be (easily) evoked,
yet an error is made due to premature responding or a momen-
tary lack of attention to the task (Shalgi et al., 2007). Deﬁned this
way, if errors are made due to mistakes, no error processing can
be expected a-priori, as the correct response is unknown. Thus,
the lack of Ne for Unaware errors in Scheffers and Coles (2000;
who used reduced stimulus quality) and in Hewig et al. (2011;
who used a digit entering task, which relies on a participant’s
digitspan)studiescouldbeattributed tothe possibilitythaterrors
wereofthe mistakekind.Thispossibilityisreducedinourcurrent
task, as the stimuli were clearlypresented and accuracyin the task
was high (>85%). The current results, therefore, strengthens the
notion that the Ne is related to subjective awareness of an error
rather than to error processing per se.
The current results go beyond this conclusion to explain the
sourceofdifference between studies thatshownoawarenesseffect
o nt h eN e( Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005, 2007;
O’Connell et al., 2007, 2009; Pavone et al., 2009; Shalgi et al.,
2009; Dhar et al., 2011; Hughes and Yeung, 2011) and the studies
that show such an effect (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Praamstra
et al., 2003; Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004a; Maier et al., 2008;
SteinhauserandYeung,2010;Woodman,2010;Hewig etal.,2011;
Wessel et al., 2011). As described above, when we separated our
subjects to high and low conﬁdence groups, we obtained both
results, depending on individual subjects’ error reporting ten-
dencies: across all bets (which parallels the standard procedure
for Ne calculation), there was a strong Ne error awareness effect
for high conﬁdence subjects, but not for low conﬁdence subjects.
Error-reporting experiments likely include a mixture of subjects
who are more conﬁdent about their performance in the task (i.e.,
have less instances of partial awareness) and subjects who are
less conﬁdent. When a large enough group of subjects is unsure
about their own accuracy, both the Aware Error and the Unaware
Error bins are contaminated by trials that belong to the other bin.
A reported error, labeled “Aware,” might be accompanied by a
relatively low level of awareness, lowering the average Ne of the
Aware errors bin, while an unreported error, labeled “Unaware,”
mayin fact be accompaniedby some awarenessandtherefore add
totheaverageamplitudeoftheUnawareerrorsbin.Consequently,
the grand average results, which do not take into account these
individual error-reporting differences may not show a signiﬁcant
Ne awareness effect. Indeed, as noted also by Wessel et al. (2011),
several previous studies which did not report a statistically signif-
icant difference between the Ne to Aware and Unawareerrors, did
show a numerically smaller Ne in the latter case, as we also show
here in the grand average across all subjects and bets. Moreover,
we would assume that in difﬁcult tasks, in which the conﬁdence
aboutresponse accuracyislowerforallsubjects comparedtotheir
conﬁdence in an easier task, we would be less likely to obtain an
Ne awareness effect, as more trials are expected to be in the “gray
zone” of awareness.
Error awareness has previouslybeen ascribed mainly to the Pe.
Indeed, the Pe, and not the Ne, has already been used to exam-
ine the incidence of error awareness in patient studies (Jonkman
et al., 2007; Larson and Perlstein, 2009; O’Connell et al., 2009;
Wiersema et al., 2009). Our study replicates the sensitivity of the
Pe to awareness of errors: Aware errors elicit a higher sustained
positivity around300mspost-response.Inwhatweseeasthecrit-
ical condition, in which subjects were highly conﬁdent of their
decision, the Pe for Unaware errors could not be differentiated
from the response elicited in Correct trials, as was the case for the
Ne.That is,bothNeandPewere elicited onlybyAwareerrors.The
results fromthe lessconﬁdentsubjects arelessclear,however.Like
the case of the Ne, the Pe awareness effect was not signiﬁcant for
low bets. Yet unlike in the case of the Ne, the interaction between
the high and low conﬁdence groups and error awareness was not
signiﬁcant for the Pe. Also, although one could surmise that for
Correct responses with low conﬁdence some Pe would emerge
(reﬂecting some level of false error awareness), no signiﬁcant dif-
ference was found between correct answers followed by bet 1 and
3i nt h i sgr o up( FigureA2D).Sinceinallpreviousstudiesoferror
awareness, in which amix ofconﬁdentand less conﬁdentsubjects
must have been included, a Pe awareness effect was nevertheless
found, we can conjecture that the Pe awareness effect reﬂects a
more binary decision regarding the error, whereas the Ne is more
sensitive to the level of conﬁdence. We previously proposed that
the Pe may not even be a truly response-locked component, but
a manifestation of a delayed evaluation (reﬂected by a P3b) of
the stimulus preceding the response (Shalgi et al., 2009). The
continuation of that inquiry will be reported elsewhere.
The main shortcoming of our study, like the studies of
Scheffers and Coles (2000)a n dHewig et al. (2011), is the difﬁ-
culty of directly comparing between bet 1 and bet 3 responses in
the same subjects. Although all our subjects made use of the full
range of the betting scale, only three subjects out of 22 (13.6%)
made enough 1 and 3 bets for both Aware and Unaware errors. A
much larger pool of subjects would have been required to ﬁnd
a substantial group with enough error trials for within-subject
comparisons. This obstacle, may suggest in fact that some indi-
viduals tend to either be mostly conﬁdent about their responses
or mostly unsure of them. One might argue that the conﬁdence
report, as reﬂected by the bets, is not really related to differ-
ences in the level of error awareness between the subjects, but
rather reﬂects subjects’ tendency to be more decisive or daring
when making their bets, or their perceived demand characteris-
tics. However, we argue that if this were the case, we would not
have found the dissociation we report here at the time window of
the Ne (i.e., when the response was made), between high and low
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conﬁdent subjects, and between high and low bets. It would be
interesting to study what other traits these individual differences
correlate with, and whether we could use these traits to create
more homogenous groups for the study of error processing with
or without awareness. Recent studies have pointed to the effect of
individual differences in demographic characteristics (such as age
and sex), personality traits (such as absentmindedness, impulsiv-
ity, affective style, anxiety), affective and motivational variables
and behavioral performance (e.g., response speed) on error pro-
cessing (e.g., Hester et al., 2004; Pailing and Segalowitz, 2004b;
Boksem et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2010). Attention to individual
differences maybe criticalforadvancingourunderstandingofthe
role of the ERP components in error processing.
Can error monitoring occur without conscious recognition?
Some studies show evidence for error processing without aware-
ness. van Gaal et al. (2010) showed that behavioral conﬂict
adaptation can occur when the response conﬂict occurs without
awareness. Cohen et al. (2009) recently showed using EEG that
error monitoring can occur when subjects are not only unaware
of their errors, but also of the actual stimuli; when subjects
performed a Go/No-Go task, errors following a masked No-Go
signal elicited directional synchrony between the ACC and the
occipital cortex, akin to the synchrony found when the No-Go
signal was consciously perceived. Similarly, Ursu et al. (2009)
showed, using fMRI, that the ACC, considered to be the locus
of error processing and the origin of the Ne, was active when
subjects were presented with a response conﬂict of which they
were seemingly unaware (because a target’s location violates an
implicitly learned sequence), or when they made errors of which
they were unaware. In contrast, other studies suggest that aware-
ness is necessary for conﬂict adaptation (Kunde, 2003)o rf o r
the activation of the ACC (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2003). Whereas
unconscious error processing may take place, the question is
at what level and what are the prerequisites for error aware-
ness to emerge. The evidence from our study, which controlled
error awareness more closely, does not support error processing
without awareness at the stage immediately after an error was
made, as indexed by the Ne. We suggest that future studies of
error awareness must address the methods used for awareness
testing.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank Shany Grossman, Assaf Breska, and Tali Shrem
for their help in the production of this manuscript. Supported by
the National Institute of Psychobiology in Israel founded by the
Charles E. Smith family.
REFERENCES
B o k s e m ,M .A . ,T o p s ,M . ,W e s t e r ,A .E . ,
M e i j m a n ,T .F . ,a n dL o r i s t ,M .M .
(2006). Error-related ERP compo-
nents and individual differences in
punishment and reward sensitivity.
Brain Res. 1101, 92–101.
Brazdil, M., Roman, R., Falkenstein,
M., Daniel, P., Jurak, P., and Rektor,
I. (2002). Error processing – evi-
dence from intracerebral ERP
recordings. Exp. Brain Res. 146,
460–466.
Chang, W. P., Davies, P. L., and Gavin,
W. J. (2010). Individual differ-
ences in error monitoring in healthy
adults: psychological symptoms and
antisocial personality characteris-
tics. Eur. J. Neurosci. 32, 1388–1396.
Cohen, M. X., van Gaal, S.,
Ridderinkhof, K. R., and Lamme,
V. A. (2009). Unconscious errors
enhance prefrontal-occipital oscil-
latory synchrony. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 3:54. doi: 10.3389/neuro.
09.054.2009
Coles, M. G., Scheffers, M. K., and
Holroyd, C. B. (2001). Why is
t h e r ea nE R N / N eo nc o r r e c tt r i a l s ?
Response representations, stimulus-
related components, and the theory
of error-processing. Biol. Psychol.
56, 173–189.
Debener, S., Ullsperger, M., Siegel, M.,
Fiehler, K., von Cramon, D. Y., and
Engel, A. K. (2005). Trial-by-trial
coupling of concurrent electroen-
cephalogram and functional mag-
netic resonance imaging identiﬁes
the dynamics of performance moni-
toring. J.Neurosci. 25,11730–11737.
Dehaene, S., Artiges, E., Naccache, L.,
M a r t e l l i ,C . ,V i a r d ,A . ,S c h u r h o f f ,
F., Recasens, C., Martinot, M. L.,
Leboyer, M., and Martinot, J. L.
(2003). Conscious and subliminal
conﬂicts in normal subjects and
patients withschizophrenia: the role
of the anterior cingulate. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100, 13722–13727.
Dehaene, S., Posner, M. I., and Tucker,
D. M. (1994). Localization of a
neural system for error-detection
and compensation. Psychol. Sci. 5,
303–305.
Dhar, M., Wiersema, J. R., and
Pourtois, G. (2011). Cascade of
neural events leading from error
commission to subsequent aware-
ness revealed using EEG source
imaging. PLoS One 6:e19578. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0019578
Endrass, T., Franke, C., and Kathmann,
N. (2005). Error awareness in a
saccade countermanding task. J.
Psychophysiol. 19, 275–280.
Endrass, T., Reuter, B., and Kathmann,
N. (2007). ERP correlates of con-
scious error recognition: aware and
unaware errors in an antisaccade
task. Eur. J. Neurosci. 26,1714–1720.
Falkenstein, M., Hohnsbein, J.,
Hoormann,J.,andBlanke,L.(1991).
Effects of crossmodal divided atten-
tion on late ERP components. II.
Error processing in choice reac-
tion tasks. Electroencephalogr. Clin.
Neurophysiol. 78, 447–455.
Ford, J. M. (1999). Schizophrenia:
the broken P300 and beyond.
Psychophysiology 36, 667–682.
G e h r i n g ,W .J . ,G r o s s ,B . ,C o l e s ,M . ,
Meyer, D., and Donchin, E. (1993).
A neural system for error detection
and compensation. Psychol. Sci. 4,
385–390.
Hester, R.,Fassbender, C.,andGaravan,
H. (2004). Individual differences
in error processing: a review and
reanalysis of three event-related
fMRI studies using the GO/NOGO
task. Cereb. Cortex 14, 986–994.
H e s t e r ,R . ,F o x e ,J .J . ,M o l h o l m ,
S., Shpaner, M., and Garavan,
H. (2005). Neural mechanisms
involved in error processing: a
comparison of errors made with
and without awareness. Neuroimage
27, 602–608.
H e w i g ,J . ,C o l e s ,M .G . ,T r i p p e ,R .
H., Hecht, H., and Miltner, W.
H. (2011). Dissociation of Pe and
ERN/Ne in the conscious recogni-
tionofanerror.Psychophysiology48,
1390–1396.
Hughes, G., and Yeung, N. (2011).
Dissociable correlates of response
conﬂict and error awareness
in error-related brain activity.
Neuropsychologia 49, 405–415.
Jonkman, L. M., van Melis, J. J.,
Kemner, C., and Markus, C. R.
(2007). Methylphenidate improves
deﬁcient error evaluation in chil-
dren with ADHD: an event-related
brain potential study. Biol. Psychol.
76, 217–229.
J u n g ,T .P . ,M a k e i g ,S . ,H u m p h r i e s ,C . ,
Lee, T. W., Mckeown, M. J., Iragui,
V., and Sejnowski, T. J. (2000).
Removing electroencephalographic
artifacts by blind source separation.
Psychophysiology 37, 163–178.
Klein, T. A., Endrass, T., Kathmann,
N., Neumann, J., von Cramon,
D. Y., and Ullsperger, M. (2007).
Neuralcorrelates oferrorawareness.
Neuroimage 34, 1774–1781.
Koch, C., and Preuschoff, K. (2007).
Betting the house on consciousness.
Nat. Neurosci. 10, 140–141.
Kunde, W. (2003). Sequential modu-
lations of stimulus-response corre-
spondence effects depend on aware-
ness of response conﬂict. Psychon.
Bull. Rev. 10, 198–205.
Larson, M. J., and Perlstein, W. M.
(2009). Awareness of deﬁcits and
error processing after traumatic
brain injury. Neuroreport 20,
1486–1490.
Maier, M., Steinhauser, M., and
Hubner, R. (2008). Is the error-
related negativity amplitude related
to error detectability? Evidence
from effects of different error types.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 20, 2263–2273.
N i e u w e n h u i s ,S . ,R i d d e r i n k h o f ,K .R . ,
Blom, J., Band, G. P., and Kok, A.
(2001). Error-related brain poten-
tials are differentially related to
awareness of response errors: evi-
dence from an antisaccade task.
Psychophysiology 38, 752–760.
O’Connell, R. G., Bellgrove, M. A.,
Dockree, P. M., Lau, A., Hester, R.,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 124 | 11Shalgi and Deouell Awareness affects the error negativity
Garavan, H., Fitzgerald, M., Foxe,
J. J., and Robertson, I. H. (2009).
The neural correlates of deﬁcient
error awareness in attention-deﬁcit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).
Neuropsychologia 47, 1149–1159.
O’Connell, R. G., Dockree, P. M.,
Bellgrove, M. A., Kelly, S. P., Hester,
R., Garavan, H., Robertson, I. H.,
and Foxe, J. J. (2007). The role
of cingulate cortex in the detec-
tion of errors with and without
awareness: a high-density electrical
mapping study. Eur. J. Neurosci. 25,
2571–2579.
Pailing, P. E., and Segalowitz, S. J.
(2004a). The effects of uncertainty
in error monitoring on associated
ERPs. Brain Cogn. 56, 215–233.
Pailing, P. E., and Segalowitz, S.
J. (2004b). The error-related
negativity as a state and trait
measure: motivation, personality,
and ERPs in response to errors.
Psychophysiology 41, 84–95.
P a v o n e ,E .F . ,M a r z i ,C .A . ,a n d
Girelli, M. (2009). Does sublimi-
nal visual perception have an error-
monitoring system? Eur. J. Neurosci.
30, 1424–1431.
Perrin, F. (1990). Correction.
Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophy-
siol. 76, 565.
Perrin, F., Pernier, J., Bertrand,
O., and Echallier, J. F. (1989).
Spherical splines for scalp
potential and current density
mapping. Electroencephalogr. Clin.
Neurophysiol. 72, 184–187.
Persaud, N., McLeod, P., and Cowey,
A. (2007). Post-decision wagering
objectively measures awareness.
Nat. Neurosci. 10, 257–261.
P i c t o n ,T .W . ,B e n t i n ,S . ,B e r g ,P . ,
Donchin, E., Hillyard, S. A.,
J o h n s o n ,R .J r . ,M i l l e r ,G .A . ,R i t t e r ,
W . ,R u c h k i n ,D .S . ,R u g g ,M .D . ,
and Taylor, M. J. (2000). Guidelines
for using human event-related
potentials to study cognition:
recording standards and publica-
tion criteria. Psychophysiology 37,
127–152.
Praamstra, P., Turgeon, M., Hesse,
C. W., Wing, A. M., and Perryer,
L. (2003). Neurophysiological
correlates of error correction
in sensorimotor-synchronization.
Neuroimage 20, 1283–1297.
Reason, J. T. (1990). Human Error.
New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Scheffers, M. K., and Coles, M. G.
(2000). Performance monitoring
in a confusing world: error-
related brain activity, judgments
of response accuracy, and types of
errors. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 26, 141–151.
Shalgi, S., Barkan, I., and Deouell, L. Y.
(2009). On the positive side of error
processing: error-awareness positiv-
ity revisited. Eur. J. Neurosci. 29,
1522–1532.
Shalgi, S., and Deouell, L. Y. (2010). “Is
there a hemispatial bias in detecting
errors and in error awareness?”, in
The Israel Society for Neuroscience
19th Annual Meeting Eilat: Journal
of Molecular Neuroscience,v o l .
45. (Eilat, Israel: Humana Press),
1–137.
S h a l g i ,S . ,O ’ C o n n e l l ,R .G . ,D e o u e l l ,
L. Y., and Robertson, I. H. (2007).
Absent minded but accurate:
delaying responses increases
accuracy but decreases error
awareness. Exp. Brain Res. 182,
119–124.
Simons, R. F. (2009). The way of
our errors: theme and variations.
Psychophysiology 47, 1–14.
Steinhauser, M., and Yeung, N. (2010).
Decision processes in human per-
formance monitoring. J. Neurosci.
30, 15643–15653.
Stemmer, B., Segalowitz, S. J., Witzke,
W., and Schonle, P. W. (2004). Error
detection in patients with lesions
to the medial prefrontal cortex:
an ERP study. Neuropsychologia 42,
118–130.
Ullsperger, M., Harsay, H. A., Wessel,
J. R., and Ridderinkhof, K. R.
(2010). Conscious perception of
errors and its relation to the ante-
rior insula. Brain Struct. Funct. 214,
629–643.
Ursu, S., Clark, K. A., Aizenstein, H.
J., Stenger, V. A., and Carter, C. S.
(2009). Conﬂict-related activity in
the caudal anterior cingulate cortex
in the absence of awareness. Biol.
Psychol. 80, 279–286.
van Gaal, S., Lamme, V. A., and
Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2010).
Unconsciously triggered conﬂict
adaptation. PLoS One 5:e11508. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0011508
Vidal, F., Hasbroucq, T., Grapperon, J.,
and Bonnet, M. (2000). Is the ‘error
negativity’ speciﬁc to errors? Biol.
Psychol. 51, 109–128.
Wessel, J. R., Danielmeier, C., and
Ullsperger, M. (2011). Error aware-
ness revisited: accumulation of
multimodal evidence from central
and autonomic nervous systems.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 3021–3036.
Wiersema, J. R., van der Meere, J.
J., and Roeyers, H. (2009). ERP
correlates of error monitoring in
adult ADHD. J. Neural. Transm.
116, 371–379.
Woodman, G. F. (2010). Masked tar-
gets trigger event-related potentials
indexing shifts of attention but not
error detection. Psychophysiology
47, 410–414.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 26 January 2012; accepted: 18
April 2012; published online: 04 May
2012.
Citation: Shalgi S and Deouell LY
(2012) Is any awareness necessary for an
Ne?. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:124. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2012.00124
Copyright © 2012 Shalgi and Deouell.
This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution Non Commercial
License, which permits non-commercial
use, distribution, and reproduction in
other forums, provided the original
authors and source are credited.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 124 | 12Shalgi and Deouell Awareness affects the error negativity
APPENDIX
NUMBER OF EEG SEGMENTS IN THE HIGH AND LOW
CONFIDENCE GROUPS
The High Conﬁdence (HiC) group was comprised of the nine
subjects who had more than 20 bet 3 segments for both Aware
and Unaware Errors and less than 20 bet 1segments for both
error types. The Low Conﬁdence (LoC) Group was comprised of
the eight subjects who had more than 20 bet 1segments for both
Aware and Unaware errors. Table A1 summarizes the number of
trials in each group.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSE-LOCKED WAVEFORMS AFTER
SUBTRACTING THE STIMULUS-LOCKED WAVEFORM
In the response-locked waveform, the peak-to-trough CRN
appears to be riding on a slow positive wave starting well before
the response, which creates an impression that the onset-to-
peak CRN is around the same size or even larger than the Ne
(FigureA1A). We hypothesized that the slow positivity is a resid-
ual of the jittered stimulus-locked target P3 (FigureA1C). To
investigate this hypothesis, we calculated for each subject the
mean ERP of the stimulus-locked response, separately for each
response type. Then, for each single response-locked segment
we subtracted the relevant condition’s stimulus-locked ERP, after
aligning the two waveforms according to that trial’s RT. Trials
with RTs longer than 1000ms could not be included in this
Table A1 | Mean number and range of error trials of subjects included
in the High and Low Conﬁdence groups.
High Conﬁdence Low Conﬁdence
Aware Errors (all bets) 71.1 (29−118) 119.6 (55−176)
Bet 1 7.9 (0−18) 47.9 (28−73)
Bet 3 45.3 (27−70) 33.5 (2−65)
Unaware Errors (all bets) 85.6 (39−141) 110.9 (61−159)
Bet 1 15 (0−27) 59.1 (30−148)
Bet 3 48.9 (21−95) 23.3 (1−87)
procedure as the stimulus-locked grand average was not long
enough to be aligned with the response-locked ERP, resulting
in the elimination of between 2 and 31 error trials per sub-
ject. The grand average result is presented in FigureA1B,w h i c h
shows the elimination of the slow positivity, and conﬁrms that
the CRN is in fact smaller than the Ne. Statistical analysis of the
resulting Ne amplitudes replicates the ﬁnding from the uncor-
rected waveforms reported in the Results section of the paper,
namely that the Ne for errors is signiﬁcantly different from the
CRNbutnotdifferentbetween AwareandUnawareErrors—there
was a signiﬁcant effect in a one-way repeated measures ANOVA
for Response Type [F(2, 42) = 8.17, p < 0.005, ε = 0.76] which
stemmed from a difference between errors and correct responses
[t(21) = 5.27, p < 0.001], while there was no difference between
the Ne amplitude for Aware and Unaware Errors [t(21) = 1.47,
p = 0.16].
ANALYSIS OF THE CORRECT RESPONSE-LOCKED WAVEFORMS
OF THE LOW CONFIDENCE GROUP AFTER SUBTRACTING THE
STIMULUS-LOCKED WAVEFORM
In the Low Conﬁdence group, there were enough Correct
responses with bet 1 and bet 3 forc o m p a r i s o nw i t h i ns u b j e c t s
between bets. However, the response-locked grand average of the
Correct response on which subjects bet 3seems to be riding on
ap o s i t i v ep r e - r e s p o n s ew a v e( s e eFiguresA2A and A2C). As in
Appendix section B, we subtracted the mean of the stimulus-
locked response (separately for bet 1 and bet 3) of each subject
from each response-locked trial according to its RT. Trials with
RTs longer than 1000ms could not be included in this analysis,
resulting in the elimination of between 6 and 128 correct tri-
als per subject (this elimination did not signiﬁcantly reduce the
numberofsingletrialsforeachsubjectandbet—rangeafterelim-
ination: 31–960). The grand averageresult for electrodes FCz and
Pz is shown in FiguresA2B and A2D. Statistical analysis of the
resulting CRN and Pe amplitudes shows that the CRN for bet 3
was signiﬁcantly smaller than the CRN for bet 1 in these sub-
jects [t(7) = 2.38, p < 0.05] but there was no difference in Pe
[t(7) = 1.01, p = 0.35].
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FIGURE A1 | Grand average waveforms at FCz of (A) the original
response-locked results, (B) the response-locked results after the
subtraction of the stimulus-locked ERPs, and (C) the stimulus-locked
waveforms. The shaded area in the stimulus-locked
waveforms represents the average reaction time ± one standard
deviation.
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FIGURE A2 | Response-locked grand average waveforms of
correct responses of the Low Conﬁdence group. (A) The
original results at FCz; (B) the results after the subtraction of the
stimulus-locked ERPs at FCz. (C) The original results at Pz;
(D) the results after the subtraction of the stimulus-locked
ERPs at Pz.
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